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In this research note/replication, we apply the construct of jurisprudential regimes as described in
our recent article to the jurisprudential area of search and seizure. Given the centrality of this area
of Supreme Court decision making in the core studies supporting the attitudinal model, replicating our analysis of the jurisprudential regime construct in this area provides an important test of
the concept. Our results produce strong support for the proposition that post-Mapp decision making can be separated into distinct regimes, with a set of important cases decided in 1983-1984
demarcating the regimes. The predictors of decisions in the two periods are consistent with the
types of changes one would expect the regime shift to produce. Our findings challenge the
attitudinalists’ proposition that there is at best negligible statistical evidence that law influences
Supreme Court decision making.
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Proponents of the attitudinal model of Supreme Court decision
making have attempted to frame the Supreme Court decision-making
research question as law versus the political attitudes of the justices.
The only effective statistical test for law that has been devised to date,
according to Segal and Spaeth (1996), is to assess whether the justices
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originally dissented from a key precedent but later adhered to it in
progeny cases.1 “We test arguments from the legal model claiming
that the United States Supreme Court justices will follow previously
established legal rules even when they disagree with them; i.e. that
they are influenced by stare decisis” (p. 971). In their most extreme
statement of their position, Segal and Spaeth (1994) contend that the
“the attitudinal model is a complete and adequate model of the
Supreme Court’s decisions on the merits” and “attitudinal factors are
all that systematically explain the votes of the justices” (p. 11). In a
somewhat later analysis, Spaeth and Segal (1999) concede that justices might defer to law over their policy preferences on some occasions but that “the overall levels of precedential behavior are so low
that only . . . preferential models . . . appear to be in the right ballpark”
(p. 288).
In a recent article, we proposed a new way of conceptualizing the
role of law in explanations of Supreme Court decision making (Richards & Kritzer, 2002). We argue that it is incorrect to think of law at the
Supreme Court level as operating through the traditional mechanisms
of plain meaning, precedent, or intent of the drafters. Given the
Court’s discretionary docket, the cases decided by the Court are precisely those that cannot be decided through the relatively mechanistic
processes that Segal and Spaeth label the “legal model.”
In our earlier article, we argue that the influence of law is to be
found in what we label jurisprudential regimes. We define a jurisprudential regime as “a key precedent, or a set of related precedents, that
structures the way in which the Supreme Court justices evaluate key
elements of cases in arriving at decisions in a particular legal area”
(Richards & Kritzer, 2002, p. 308). Empirically, jurisprudential regimes
show up in terms of the variables influencing justices’ decisions and
can be best detected by looking and testing for changes in regime in a
particular jurisprudential area. For example, a regime may institute a
new standard of review or balancing test. Justices then apply the
regime in the relevant area of law, which changes how case factors
matter to the justices. We have tested this theory by examining
Supreme Court decisions in the area of free expression (Richards &
Kritzer, 2002) and in the area of the Establishment Clause (Kritzer &
Richards, 2003). In the free expression area, we hypothesized that the
1972 companion cases Chicago Police Department v. Mosley and
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Grayned v. Rockford demarcated a regime change that is reflected in a
central distinction between regulation that is content neutral and regulation that is content based. Our statistical analysis provided strong
support for the theory as applied in this area of Supreme Court jurisprudence. In the Establishment Clause area, we hypothesized that
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) demarcated a regime shift and that the factors encompassed in the much discussed Lemon test would be more
influential after 1971; again, our statistical analysis provided strong
support for our theory.
Our core argument is that the influence of law on Supreme Court
decision making must be considered from a neoinstitutional perspective (see Clayton & Gillman, 1999; Epstein & Knight, 1998) rather
than as a mechanical construct dictating the outcome of cases. That is,
law, like other institutions, is created by actors (justices) with political
goals (attitudes) whose subsequent decisions are then in turn influenced but not determined by the institutional structure they have created. We point to the early work of Shapiro (1964, 1968) on political
jurisprudence, and its later development by Smith (1988), as reflecting these kinds of institutional influences. Asserting that the Court
and its justices are political by no means precludes them from having a
different relationship to law and legal decision making than is the case
for politicians in the elected branches. As we (Richards & Kritzer,
2002) noted, “Leaving jurisprudence out of the analytic framework
fails to recognize both the distinctive nature of courts and the theoretical
point that ideas and institutions matter” (p. 306).
But why would politically independent, politically insulated decision makers such as the justices not simply follow their political preferences? We argue that the justices create jurisprudential regimes to
provide guidance to other political actors and to themselves.2 The goal
here is consistency, both for themselves and for other political actors
(Dworkin, 1978): As the justices decide a case, they reason about how
the particular facts of the instant case fit with the principles of the relevant regime they have established in order to promote consistent treatment of similar situations (Richards & Kritzer, 2002, p. 307). This reasoning process also enables the justices to make appeals to their
colleagues that are more than just first-personal rationalizations of
their own policy preferences (Nagel, 1997; Wahlbeck, Spriggs, &
Maltzman, 1998). Thus, we (Richards & Kritzer, 2002, p. 308) argue
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jurisprudential regimes help to overcome the coordination problems
that occur if each of the justices seeks only to maximize his or her
policy goals.
A central question not answered by our original article is whether
the pattern we found for free expression cases can be found for other
jurisprudential areas. As noted above, we have extended the analysis
to the area of the Establishment Clause (Kritzer & Richards, 2003). In
this research note, we extend our approach to the area of search and
seizure, which has been prominently analyzed by Segal and Spaeth
(1993, pp. 216-231; 2002, pp. 314-326), in making their argument
about the attitudinal model. Our theoretical contribution, then, is twofold. First, we attempt to expand the jurisprudential regime theory
beyond its previous applications to freedom of expression and the
Establishment Clause. If it also explains search-and-seizure decisions, this would provide further evidence that the theory is
generalizable. Second, we directly challenge the key fact-pattern
model that has been touted as prime evidence supporting the attitudinal model. If we demonstrate that the jurisprudential regime model
can explain decision making in search-and-seizure cases, this means
that Segal and Spaeth’s model of search-and-seizure decision making
is underspecified and that Segal and Spaeth have overstated the
significance of their model for the debate over whether law matters.
Segal’s (1984) original explanation of Supreme Court decision
making in the area of Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure cases
was presented in support of a legal model. This model considered
legal factors such as whether the search or seizure took place in a home
or in a car and whether there was a warrant supporting the search.
Whether these facts matter for legal or attitudinal reasons is ambiguous, as Segal noted in 1984. Later, Segal and Spaeth (1993) accurately
point out that “Facts obviously affect the decisions of the Supreme
Court, but on that point the attitudinal model does not differ from the
legal model” (p. 220). In 1993 and 2002, Segal and Spaeth present a
model of search-and-seizure decisions very similar to Segal’s earlier
model but claim that it supports the attitudinal model. In assessing the
influence of the content-neutrality regime for freedom of expression
law (Richards & Kritzer, 2002) and the influence of the Lemon test in
Establishment Clause cases (Kritzer & Richards, 2003), we have
gained leverage over the ambiguity of these case factors by focusing
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on whether the regime conditioned their influence. In this article, we
use jurisprudential regime theory to ascertain whether the justices
evaluate the search-and-seizure case factors in a significantly different
way after a regime is established.
THE SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE REGIME

We hypothesize that six important cases decided in 1983 and 1984
created precedents that constitute a jurisprudential regime that breaks
with the Court’s prior approaches to Fourth Amendment search-andseizure jurisprudence by changing how the justices weigh the elements of cases. In our initial planning for this analysis, we consulted
with a colleague who regularly teaches a course focusing on criminal
law and procedure at the Supreme Court level and who was familiar
with the jurisprudential regime concept. He identified the good faith
exception as a key shift, with 1984 as a likely break point, because the
good faith exception changed “the level of scrutiny that the justices
are to employ in assessing . . . case factors” (Richards & Kritzer, 2002,
p. 310). We then consulted a constitutional law civil liberties casebook
(O’Brien, 1997) that confirmed our colleague’s point that the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule was a major shift that was
established in 1984 and also pointed out four other cases decided at
this time that fundamentally altered the Court’s approach to search
and seizure. We then used the hypertext citations of Supreme Court
opinions at Findlaw.com to ensure that these cases were the original
Supreme Court cases in which these particular regime-defining propositions of law were established. We later looked to three additional
books, LaFave’s authoritative, five-volume search-and-seizure treatise (1996) with cumulative supplement (2004), a casebook on constitutional issues of criminal procedure (Hall, 1997), and a search-andseizure handbook (Moylan, cited in Greenhalgh, 2003), which confirmed the expectations of O’Brien and our colleague that the cases we
identified stood out as demarcating a new search and search regime.3
We also examined the most recent version of O’Brien (2003). As we
discuss below, this hypothesized post-1984 regime should reflect a
shift to a less libertarian view of the Fourth Amendment protections
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against unreasonable government searches and seizures that can be
operationalized in terms of four specific hypotheses.
Generally, probable cause is required for a search and/or seizure to
pass constitutional muster.
In determining whether probable cause has been established, judges
consider the specificity of what is to be searched, and the particularity
of what is to be seized. Because police often rely on informants, the
Court also demands that police show that information is reliable, not
vague, and sufficient for judges to draw their own conclusions about.
(O’Brien, 2003, pp. 838-839)

Aguilar v. Texas (1964) established two independent requirements for
probable cause. Police must explain how informants know what they
know and why the police believe that the information is accurate. Prior
to 1983, a failure on the part of the government to meet either one of
these requirements meant that the search lacked probable cause and
would most likely be held unconstitutional. However, the 1983 Illinois v. Gates decision began the move toward a new jurisprudential
regime by holding that the two requirements were no longer independent. In a closely related 1984 decision (Massachusetts v. Upton),
the Court held that the “totality of the circumstances” is enough to justify a finding of probable cause (Hall, 1997, p. 92; O’Brien, 1997, p.
774). This leads to the expectation that after 1984, the Court will be
more likely to accept lower court findings of probable cause because
the Court would no longer apply the stringent Aguilar test in evaluating the determinations of the police and the lower courts.
Moylan (2003, p. 13) notes that Gates is a “highly deferential standard” that “dismantled the highly structured framework of analysis
that had developed over the course of the preceding nineteen years.”
LaFave (1996, vol. 2, p. 16) also comments on the higher level of deference afforded to findings of probable cause post-Gates and Upton,
As the Court emphasized more recently in Massachusetts v. Upton,
Gates teaches that a reviewing court is not to conduct “a de novo probable cause determination” but instead is merely to decide “whether the
evidence viewed as a whole” provided a “substantial basis” for the
magistrate’s finding of probable cause.
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Gates and Upton represent a major shift in the manner in which appellate courts will assess (or fail to assess) magistrate’s findings of probable cause.
Certainly the potential for highly inconsistent and largely
unreviewable probable cause determinations is there. When the majority in Gates says that from now on probable cause is to be ascertained
by a “totality of the circumstances analysis,” one cannot help but recall
the pre-Miranda experience under the old “totality of the circumstances” voluntariness test for determining the admissibility of confessions. That confession standard proved to be a failure; it “left police
without needed guidance” and “impaired the effectiveness and legitimacy of judicial review.” Should that experience now be replicated in
the Fourth Amendment area as a result of Gates, then Justice Brennan
will have proved prophetic in declaring that “today’s decision threatens
to obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our
form of government, where officers are under the law, and the policestate, where they are the law.” (LaFave, 1996 vol. 2, p. 103, internal
citations omitted)

In combination with Gates, Upton’s totality-of-the-circumstances
test leads us to expect that the level of protection afforded to the particular location or object of the search will diminish after the regime is
established, due to the more deferential standards that are employed in
determining the specificity and particularity necessary to establish
probable cause. These two cases also lead us to expect that lower court
findings of probable cause should lead the Supreme Court to uphold
searches after these two cases, because Gates and Upton require all
reviewing courts to show greater deference to magistrate’s findings of
probable cause.
The 1984 search-and-seizure jurisprudential regime was also shaped
by two 1984 companion cases, United States v. Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard. Previously, the Court had established that evidence
obtained through searches based on defective warrants (i.e., that
lacked probable cause) was subject to the exclusionary rule laid down
in Mapp v. Ohio (1961). “Leon and Sheppard together, then, amount
to a good faith rule for with-warrant cases,” as LaFave (1996, vol. 1, p.
53) observes. This good faith exception means that the exclusionary
rule no longer applies to situations where the police, acting in good
faith, seize evidence in the context of reliance on a warrant that lacked
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probable cause (O’Brien, 1997, p. 881). In Moylan’s (2003) analysis,
the good faith exception is critical to the manner in which the justices
evaluate the appropriate sanction for a Fourth Amendment violation.
“No deterrent effect would be achieved by excluding the evidence
even if the judge had made a mistake in issuing the warrant,” so the
justices would not apply the exclusionary rule (Moylan, 2003, pp. 1820). Similarly, Hall (1997) notes that exclusion in this context “would
not deter future police misconduct” (p. 94). LaFave argues strongly
that this is a major shift in the Court’s approach to the Fourth
Amendment.
The point is simply this: Under the pre-Leon version of the
exclusionary rule, police had finally come to learn that it was not
enough that they had gotten a piece of paper called a warrant. Because
that warrant was subject to challenge at a later motion to suppress, it
was important to the police that the warrant be properly issued. . . . But
under Leon there is no reason to go through such cautious procedures
and every reason not to. Why take the risk that some conscientious
prosecutor or police supervisor will say the application is insufficient
when, if some magistrate can be induced to issue a warrant on the basis
of it, the affidavit is thereafter virtually immune from challenge?
(LaFave, 1996, vol. 1, p. 64)
Moreover, as Justice Stevens emphasized in his separate dissent, “Until
today, every time the police have violated the applicable commands of
the Fourth Amendment a court has been prepared to vindicate that
Amendment by preventing the use of evidence so obtained in the prosecution’s case-in-chief against those whose rights have been violated.
Today, for the first time, this Court holds that although the Constitution
has been violated, no court should do anything about it at any time and
in any proceeding” (LaFave, 1996, vol. 1, p. 56, internal citations
omitted).

Before stating the hypotheses that are generated for us by the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, we also need to examine two
1984 companion cases that also carved out significant exceptions to
the exclusionary rule. Nix v. Williams created the inevitable discovery
exception: If the police would have inevitably discovered the illegally
obtained evidence, it does not need to be excluded (Hall, 1997, p. 75;
LaFave, 1996, vol. 5, p. 240-241; Moylan, 2003, p. 21; O’Brien, 1997,
p. 881). Similarly, Segura v. U.S. allowed an exception to the exclusionary
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rule for evidence that was gained through independent sources, sources
that were not related to an illegal search or seizure (O’Brien, 1997, p.
881). The independent source rule means that “although the evidence
gained as a result of government misconduct cannot be used in a criminal prosecution, the facts obtained by such conduct are admissible if
the government gained knowledge of these facts from an independent
source” (Hall, 1997, p. 75). In Segura, the
police made a warrantless entry of an apartment, arrested all the occupants (who were promptly removed from the scene), and then
remained within that apartment for a period of nineteen hours until a
search warrant was finally obtained and executed. (LaFave, 1996, vol.
3, p. 362)

The Court upheld the use of the evidence obtained from the search
warrant as an independent source, despite the illegality of the initial
entrance (LaFave, 1996, vol. 3, p. 363).
As with the good faith exception, these exceptions are based on the
Court’s observation that the exclusionary rule’s function of deterring
police impropriety is not applicable in these situations; these exceptions significantly alter how the justices evaluate the impact of what
would otherwise be an unconstitutional government action. “As the
Supreme Court explained in Nix v. Williams, the inevitable discovery
doctrine is similar to the independent source doctrine, in that both are
intended to ensure that suppression does not outrun the deterrence
objective” (LaFave, 1996, vol. 5, p. 244). Moylan (2003) explains
how Segura changes the Court’s weighing of case facts in terms of the
fruit of the poisonous tree analogy. “Where the alleged fruit follows
the alleged poisonous tree in point of time but is nonetheless shown to
have proceeded from an independent source, the fruit is not tainted
and should not, therefore, be suppressed” (p. 21). The good faith,
inevitable discovery, and independent source exceptions to the
exclusionary rule indicate that after the 1984 jurisprudential regime is
established, the existence of a warrant should be more likely to lead to
a decision in favor of the government. For example, if the police performed an improper search based on a defective warrant that lacked
probable cause, this would not necessarily lead to exclusion of the evidence and a decision against the government. Based on the precedents
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of the jurisprudential regime, the police could argue that they were
acting in good faith, would have inevitably discovered the evidence,
and/or had independent sources. Similarly, after 1984, even if the
police made a search following an unlawful arrest, these exceptions to
the exclusionary rule could lead to a decision in favor of the government. One additional hypothesis can be derived from the Segura ruling and its independent source exception, which is that the level of
protection afforded to particular locations such as homes should
diminish.
The result in Segura is most unfortunate. As the four dissenters quite
correctly pointed out, the majority’s conclusion “provides an affirmative incentive for warrantless and plainly unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into the home.” This is because police know now that if
they illegally impound premises for the very purpose of facilitating a
later successful warrant execution, that illegality will have no effect
upon the evidence first discovered during the warrant execution.
(LaFave, 1996, vol. 5, p. 283)
DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Segal (1984, 1985, 1986) pioneered the statistical analysis of
search-and-seizure cases. His work basically defines the factors to be
considered whenever one looks at these cases. His most recent analysis of search and seizure, done in collaboration with Harold Spaeth
(Segal & Spaeth, 2002, pp. 324-325), is included in The Supreme
Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. That analysis shows both
the impact of factual elements and the strong impact of justices’ attitudes. Our question is whether that analysis can be improved by taking
into account jurisprudential regimes. To examine this question, we
apply essentially the same approach we have used previously (Kritzer
& Richards, 2003; Richards & Kritzer, 2002); we describe this
approach below.
We rely upon a set of 228 cases covering the October 19624 through
the October 2001 terms of the Supreme Court (fall 1962 through
spring 2002).5 We include in our statistical model the same variables
used by Segal and Spaeth,6 including the same measure of attitudes.7
In their model, they consider the location or object of the search
(house, business, person, car, other/no property interest), whether the
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search was a full or partial search, whether a warrant was obtained,
and whether the lower court determined that the officer had probable
cause. They also take into account three possibilities related to arrest:
whether the search was incident to a lawful arrest, whether the search
followed but was not incident to a lawful arrest, or whether the search
followed an unlawful arrest. Finally, they consider whether the search
fell under one of the accepted exceptions to the requirement for a warrant, and the justices’ attitudes.
Our data set includes a total of 1,969 votes. In keeping with Segal
and Spaeth’s analyses, we coded the dependent variable so that a positive coefficient value indicated support for legality of the search. Summary statistics for all variables over the entire time period (including
the cases omitted from the analysis as described in the next paragraph)
and separately for the before and after periods are shown in Table 1.
The core hypothesis derived from the jurisprudential regime model
is that the factors that influence justices’decisions for a particular area
should vary across jurisprudential regimes. The results of statistical
models predicting decisions in the two periods should differ in significant and meaningful ways. One dilemma in our analysis was how to
operationalize the regime break: We could use Gates as the split point
for the jurisprudential regime because it represents the beginning of
the shift that took place over a period of about 12 months, we could use
the last case over that period, Segura, or we could use something in
between. We actually conducted the analysis several different ways
and found that the results were very similar. The results we present
below define the “before” regime as all cases in our sample before
Gates (a total of 1,119 votes) and the “after” regime as all cases after
Segura (644 votes); we omit the 203 votes from Gates through Segura.
In the discussion that follows, we use “before Gates” and “before the
regime was established” synonymously; we do likewise with the
terms “after the regime was established” and “after Segura.”
Applying our reading of the regime-defining cases to the variables
used in the models, we are able to generate four particular hypotheses.8 One, the protection afforded to the particular location or object of
the search should diminish in importance after the regime is established, due to the justices’ focus on the totality of the circumstances
that comes from Gates and Upton and due to the diminished protection afforded certain premises due to the Segura ruling. Second, if a

Downloaded from apr.sagepub.com at GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV LIB on June 11, 2013

44

AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH / January 2005
TABLE 1

Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Variable

All

Before

After

Justice’s vote (to uphold search)
Location of search
House
Business
Person
Car
Full (vs. partial) search
Warrant issued
Lower court found probable cause
Arrest (as determined by lower court)
Incident to lawful arrest
After arrest but not incident to arrest
After unlawful arrest
Exceptions
Justice’s attitude
Standard deviation
n

0.560

0.542

0.587

0.266
0.125
0.292
0.222
0.844
0.144
0.339

0.229
0.141
0.313
0.215
0.853
0.135
0.341

0.264
0.109
0.250
0.264
0.806
0.109
0.290

0.064
0.123
0.096
0.343
–0.031
0.706
1,969

0.066
0.136
0.089
0.347
0.145
0.709
1,119

0.082
0.098
0.110
0.335
–0.283
0.608
644

NOTE: With the exception of justice’s attitude, all variables are dichotomies, and their means
constitute proportions.

warrant is issued after the regime is established, this should increase
the likelihood that the search is upheld. Before the regime is established, the warrant variable alone should have less of an impact
because searches based on improper warrants would be less likely to
be meet constitutional muster. In the after period, the good faith, inevitable discovery, and independent source exceptions could be used by
the justices to uphold searches despite police reliance on unjustified or
improperly specified warrants. Our third hypothesis is that after the
regime is established, if the lower court found probable cause, this
should increase the likelihood that the search is upheld, because Gates
and Upton require reviewing judges and justices to show greater deference to determinations of probable cause. Fourth, we hypothesize
that searches made after unlawful arrest should be more likely to be
upheld after the regime is established than before, because the police
could claim the applicability of the good faith, inevitable discovery, or
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independent source exceptions, even if the decision to arrest later
turned out to be judged unlawful.
Closely following our previous work for the purpose of replication
(Richards & Kritzer, 2002, pp. 311-312), our test for a change in the
search-and-seizure regime involved the following steps:
(1) We first estimated logistic regression “models across, before, and
after the regime changes to ascertain whether” there is support for our
core hypothesis. “The key statistical test of regime-based change is a
variant of the well-known Chow test (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977) of
differences in regression results across sets of data” (Richards &
Kritzer, 2002, p. 311). Included in these models are tests of whether
specific coefficients changed across the hypothesized regimes.
(2) “The next step involved estimating additional models to rule out the
major alternative explanation that change over time can be explained
entirely by personnel (and hence attitudinal) change” (Richards &
Kritzer, 2002, p. 312). To do this, we reestimated the models limiting
the analysis to those justices who were on the Court at the time of the
hypothesized regime change.
(3) Finally, we performed a sensitivity analysis by trying alternative
annual time breaks. If the chi square statistic for the regime break was
high relative to the other annual break points, we would have strong
confirmation of a regime that shaped the influence of the jurisprudential variables. This sensitivity analysis was also reestimated for the subset
of justices on the Court at the time of the hypothesized regime change
(Richards & Kritzer, 2002, p. 312).
RESULTS

The results of this analysis for all justices on the Supreme Court
during the time period 1961-2001 are shown in Table 2. The test of
significance for differences in the coefficients before Gates and after
Segura yielded a highly significant chi-square of 72.98 (12 degrees of
freedom, p < .001).9 Clearly, the factors influencing the justices’ votes
differed in the two time periods.
In looking at specific variables, we focus on those where our tests
for interactions show that the coefficients for the two time periods differed in a statistically significant manner. The variables with such differences are indicated by symbols in the right-most column of Table 2.
Turning to the location or object of the search, we observe that
before the regime was established, the justices appear to be much less
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0.227
0.190
0.192
0.111
0.081
0.231

0.520*
–0.026
–0.026
0.902***
–1.252***
1.244
1,763
418.31

0.221
0.242
0.207
0.227
0.164
0.180
0.140

–1.112***
–1.107***
–0.879***
–0.764***
–0.834***
0.499**
0.563***

SE(b)

Before

1,119
289.59

1.453***
0.518*
–0.361
1.009***
–1.282***
1.905

–1.561***
–1.757***
–1.379***
–1.595***
–0.800***
0.696**
0.026

b

SE(b)

0.327
0.241
0.264
0.139
0.107
0.315

0.288
0.304
0.271
0.307
0.227
0.220
0.181

Two-tailed significance tests: *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. One-tailed significance test: †p < .05.

n
2
Model χ (12 df)

Location of search
House
Business
Person
Car
Full (vs. partial) search
Warrant issued
Lower court found probable cause
Arrest (as determined by lower court)
Incident to lawful arrest
After arrest but not incident to arrest
After unlawful arrest
Exceptions
Justice’s attitude
Constant

b

Combined

TABLE 2

Search and Seizure Analysis: All Justices
After

644
210.74

–0.309
–0.731*
0.399
0.822***
–1.929***
0.151

–0.585
–0.108
0.033
0.513
–1.205***
0.973**
1.419***

b

0.375
0.363
0.339
0.220
0.188
0.348

0.361
0.430
0.351
0.362
0.284
0.371
0.274

SE(b)

72.98

**

***
**
†

***

*
**
***
***

Before/After
Test
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likely to uphold searches of homes, businesses, persons, and cars than
locations where the subject does not have a property interest. (“No
property interest” is the base category for this set of variables.) After
the regime was established, the location or object of the search has
much less importance; the only location that is afforded some extra
protection appears to be homes, and the protection is much reduced
compared to the before period. Where before Gates justices might
have looked to specific location or object criteria, the diminution of
influence of these criteria in the after period would be consistent with
the movement toward a totality-of-circumstances evaluation and the
diminished protection afforded to certain premises due to Segura.
Although the difference in whether a warrant is issued before or
after the regime break does not achieve statistical significance, it does
come close. We note that the nature of the difference suggests that
whether a warrant was issued may have more importance after the
regime change; this would be consistent with the good faith, inevitable discovery, and independent source exceptions to the exclusionary
rule. Before the regime was established, whether a warrant was issued
would not have as strong an influence as it would later, because if it
was justified or used in a constitutionally impermissible way, the
search would be thrown out of court. After the regime was established,
even if a warrant was justified or used in a manner that would be constitutionally improper under the previous standards but was also used
in good faith, or if the evidence would have been inevitably discovered
or obtained through independent sources, the search would likely be
upheld.
Before Gates, the lower court’s finding of probable cause had no
measurable influence on the justices’ votes; after Segura, the lower
court’s finding of probable cause significantly increased the likelihood that a justice would vote to uphold the search. The coefficient
goes from approximately zero (0.026) to 1.419. After Segura, the
odds of the justices’ voting to uphold the search increases by a factor
of 4.13 (i.e., the odds are more than 4 times greater) if the lower court
found probable cause; before Gates, a finding of probable cause had
essentially no impact on the odds of the search being upheld. This is
consistent with the expectation that the combination of Illinois v.
Gates and Massachusetts v. Upton would lead the justices to be more
deferential to a finding of probable cause by the lower court.
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The differences we observe before and after the regime change for
the next two variables are not tied directly to any hypotheses about
changes that the regime should have generated. Nonetheless, we
include these variables in the model because we follow Segal’s prior
specification, and we report the differences because they are significant. Before Gates, a search incident to a lawful arrest was significantly more likely to be upheld; after Segura, such a search was less
likely to be upheld. A search after but not incident to an arrest was
more likely to be upheld before Gates, everything else being equal;
after Segura such a search was less likely to be upheld, everything else
being equal. We should point out that as the regime changed how the
justices evaluated particular case factors, this may have led to other,
unanticipated effects such as the ones we have just observed, possibly
due to changes in the mix of cases coming before the Court. However,
we do not claim that these changes are due to regime change.
A search following an unlawful arrest was marginally more likely
to be upheld after Segura than before Gates. This is consistent with the
development of the good faith, inevitable discovery and independent
source exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Even if an arrest was
unlawful, if the officers conducted a search on the basis of a good faith
belief that the arrest warrant was lawful or (even in nonwarrant situations) if the evidence would have been inevitably discovered or
obtained through independent sources, the search could be upheld.
Justices’ attitudes influence the justices’ votes both before Gates
and after Segura, with conservative justices more likely to vote to
uphold the search; however, the influence of attitudes is significantly
greater after Segura than before Gates. Overall, our findings produce
strong support for our hypothesis that there was a regime change
around the time of the Gates decision. Three of our four hypotheses
pertaining to specific variables were supported, and we were very
close to observing a statistically significant difference before and after
the regime change for the hypothesis pertaining to whether a warrant
was issued.
It is possible that the findings above reflect shifts not in how the justices were deciding cases but shifts in who the justices were that were
deciding the cases. As discussed above, we tested this by replicating
our analysis using only those justices who were on the Supreme Court
at the time the Gates through Segura set of cases was decided (there
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was no change in Court membership during this period). The results
of this analysis, involving a total of 1,170 votes, are shown in Table 3.
A test of significance for before-and-after differences in the coefficients yields a chi-square of 46.71 (df = 12, p < .001). The basic pattern of before-and-after differences is the same. The most noteworthy
difference is that the influence of attitudes does not shift significantly
for this limited group of justices, suggesting that some of the change
in the influence of attitudes in Table 2 may reflect that some of the justices who decided cases only before Gates were less attitudinally
driven in search-and-seizure cases than the justices who decided
Gates or who joined the Court after Segura. One other difference is
that the incident-to-unlawful-arrest variable does not even achieve
marginal significance for the subset of justices, although the magnitude of the difference between the before-and-after coefficients is
actually larger than was the case for all justices.
A final question to consider is whether the change in voting patterns before and after Gates is significant compared to other annual
before-and-after differences. To test this, we conducted the sensitivity
analysis discussed above. This involved running a series of logistic
regressions, splitting at each year from 1969 through 1995. If we have
identified a regime change, we would expect the amount of shift in the
coefficients to peak around the time of the shift. The amount of shift is
indicated by the size of the chi-square testing for before-and-after
change. Figure 1 shows the sensitivity analysis, with the solid line representing the analysis for all justices and the broken line representing
it for the justices on the Court when the regime change was occurring
in 1983-1984. The analysis shows that the peak before-and-after difference occurs using 1983 as the split, which is consistent with our
argument that there was a regime change around this period.
CONCLUSION

We have previously argued that the role of law in Supreme Court
decision making is to be found in the decision structures justices
establish to guide decisions, both their own and those of other actors.
In this research note we have replicated our previous analyses by
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0.297
0.251
0.224
0.142
0.105
0.321

0.644*
0.263
0.066
0.951***
–1.585***
1.150
1,170
376.10

0.315
0.332
0.293
0.318
0.211
0.246
0.183

–1.250***
–1.191***
–0.946**
–0.853**
–0.988***
0.665**
0.595**

SE(b)

Before

748
276.70

1.783***
0.976**
–0.310
1.200***
–1.624***
1.541

–1.603 ***
–1.848***
–1.373***
–1.529***
–0.875**
0.872**
0.197

b

SE(b)

0.417
0.333
0.313
0.187
0.130
0.416

0.403
0.424
0.364
0.409
0.302
0.303
0.238

Two-tailed significance tests: *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. One-tailed significance test: †p < .05.

n
2
Model χ (12 df)

Location of search
House
Business
Person
Car
Full (vs. partial) search
Warrant issued
Lower court found probable cause
Arrest (as determined by lower court)
Incident to lawful arrest
After arrest but not incident to arrest
After unlawful arrest
Exceptions
Justice’s attitude
Constant

b

Combined

TABLE 3

Search and Seizure Analysis: Gates Justices
After

422
149.54

–0.938
–0.705
0.466
0.567*
–1.962***
0.279

–0.378
0.040
0.105
0.407
–1.364***
0.881
1.140***

b

0.516
0.427
0.374
0.256
0.222
0.533

0.531
0.566
0.523
0.540
0.348
0.469
0.336

SE(b)

46.71

*

***
**

*

†
**
*
**

Before/After
Test
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Figure 1: Sensitivity Analysis

extending our approach to the jurisprudential area of search and seizure, a set of cases that has been a central part of Segal and Spaeth’s
analysis of the attitudinal model.
Comparing the structure of jurisprudence, as well as the models
and statistical findings, in the areas of freedom of expression and
search and seizure yields at least two worthwhile observations. First,
the content-neutrality doctrine analyzed previously (Richards & Kritzer,
2002) is arguably more sweeping in its scope than the particular doctrines examined in this article; the content-neutrality jurisprudential
regime produced significant changes in variables that were directly
linked to the regime.10 Although there is some truth to this comparison, the contrast is somewhat overstated. In our free expression
model, content neutrality did not apply to cases in which the threshold
of First Amendment protection was not met or to cases that involved
less protected categories of expression such as obscenity, so its scope
was partly limited. In addition, we observed changes in a variety of
other case factors such as the identity of the speaker or the level of government acting against the speaker; these changes were not tied
directly to the regime change. Moreover, the aggregate scope of the
search-and-seizure standards discussed here is fairly wide. Taken
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together, the good faith, inevitable discovery, and independent source
doctrines constitute major exceptions to the exclusionary rule; they
fundamentally alter how the justices weigh or balance key case factors. Similarly, the move away from a structured analysis of probable
cause toward a highly deferential totality-of-the-circumstances standard has wide-ranging implications for how the justices evaluate the
significant portion of Fourth Amendment cases dealing with probable
cause.
A second comparison is that our approach is to “retrofit” the jurisprudential regime model to Segal and Spaeth’s model, rather than
building a database from the ground up as in our free expression analysis (Richards & Kritzer, 2002). Although the jurisprudential aspects
of the search-and-seizure model may not be structured in the architectonic manner of our other models (Kritzer & Richards, 2003; Richards
& Kritzer, 2002), that may be due in part to the differences in the jurisprudence of the First and Fourth Amendments. In addition, we have
been able to tie our theoretically and jurisprudentially derived expectations for search-and-seizure cases to at least four specific variables.
Finally, the retrofitting is important because the search-and-seizure
model has been the model most prominently referred to by Segal and
Spaeth (1993, 2002) as supportive of the attitudinal model.
Just as we have shown regime shifts in free expression cases and
Establishment Clause cases, our analysis provides strong evidence
that the justices did change the way they decide search-and-seizure
cases in a manner that is consistent with a regime change around 19831984. The results of our analysis provide additional evidence in support of the jurisprudential regime approach as one way of understanding the influence of law in Supreme Court decision making, in contrast to the proposition of the attitudinalists that there is at best
negligible evidence that law matters.
NOTES
1. This approach fails to produce support for a legal model (Segal & Spaeth, 1996). Levels
of precedential behavior are quite low (Spaeth & Segal, 1999).
2. See our earlier paper (Richards & Kritzer, 2002) for a detailed discussion of why justices
use jurisprudential regimes.
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3. As in our previous analysis, we required that the candidate regime cases should have been
adopted by at least a five-member majority of the Court.
4. The 1961 Supreme Court decision in Mapp extended to all courts in the United States the
exclusionary rule that previously the Court had applied only to federal courts. Since Mapp, we
estimate that the Supreme Court has decided over 200 search-and-seizure cases. Mapp itself did
not so much set up a framework for deciding what was and was not in violation of the Fourth
Amendment as establish the consequences of such a violation. Although in one sense one might
argue that Mapp did not establish a regime as we used that term previously (Richards & Kritzer,
2002), it is likely that Mapp effectively constituted a regime shift because of the significance of
Fourth Amendment violations under Mapp; that is, it would not be surprising to find that the
Court treated cases after Mapp differently than before Mapp. We do not examine this question.
Rather, like Segal and Spaeth, we focus only on cases since Mapp.
5. The data through 1990 were generously provided by Jeff Segal. We coded additional
cases decided up to the end 2001-2002 term of the Supreme Court.
6. Arguably, there are other variables that might be included in the model: whether the solicitor general participated either as amicus or as a party, changing public opinion over time, attorney experience; we have not done so in this short note because we are more interested in testing
whether the regimes hypothesis can be applied to the model used by Segal and Spaeth.
7. A justice’s attitude is measured based on newspaper commentary at the time the justice
was appointed (see Segal & Cover, 1989; Segal, Epstein, Cameron, & Spaeth, 1995). We chose
the Segal-Cover score as the measure because we sought to replicate the Segal and Spaeth (2002)
analysis with the addition of the regime construct. For purposes of comparison, we repeated our
analysis substituting the recently developed Martin and Quinn (2002b) measures of justices’attitudes, which allows the justices’ ideal points to vary over time. The possible advantage of this
alternative measure is that it relaxes the assumption that the justices’ attitudes are stable over
time; the disadvantage is that it is computed based on the same behavior we seek to explain. Martin and Quinn (2002a, p. 18) caution about the use of their measures that “ultimately these are
vote-based measures and cannot be used per se as explanatory variables for studies of voting on
the Supreme Court.” Their point raises concerns that behavioral changes arising from a regime
shift can be incorporated into the Martin-Quinn measures and be mistaken for a change in attitude. In any case, when we repeat our analysis using the Martin-Quinn measures, our global test
of change remains significant and the same individual-level shifts appear to occur, although
dampened for some variables (particularly the setting indicators) as reflected in reduced significance levels or, for a couple of indicators, nonsignificance.
8. Although we did not establish hypotheses for changes in specific variables in advance of
doing the statistical analysis, at the suggestion of the reviewers, we have done so here to promote
analytical clarity.
9. It is worth noting that the chi-square for change we find roughly equals the overall chisquare for the models Segal (1985, p. 474) reported in his own analysis of change in Supreme
Court decision making in search-and-seizure cases and is many multiples of the chi-squares he
reports for change. The difference probably reflects a combination of the relatively little change
that had occurred by the time Segal did his analysis and the likelihood that the jurisprudential
regimes model better represents the changes that have occurred.
10. We acknowledge the suggestion of one of the anonymous reviewers that we discuss this
comparison of the two regimes.
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